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RECENT DECISIONS
Damages-Recovery of Double Damages for Conversion of
Timber-The defendant, through mistake, converted timber from
the land of the plaintiff. Held: The plaintiff did not substantiate the
allegation of legal bad faith and therefore must be restricted in his
recovery to the actual stumpage value' at the time of conversion.
Timmons v. Lakeside Lumber Co. et al., 68 So. 2d 796 (La. 1953).
The defendant, after repeated attempts to purchase the land from
the plaintiff, entered upon the plaintiff's land and cut timber which
he converted to his own use. Held: Inasmuch as the defendant knew
that he had no valid title to the land he must be held to be acting in
bad faith. Recovery was allowed for the amount of manufactured
value of the timber without allowance or deduction for the cost of
manufacture. Havard v. Luttrell, 68 So. 2d 798 (La. 1953).
These two decisions illustrate the usual measure of recovery as
codified by statute or as followed by the courts in the absence of
statute.2 The present Wisconsin statute provides:
". .. any person unlawfully cutting forest products shall be
liable to the owner or to the county holding a tax certificate ...
to the land on which the unlawful cutting was done, in a civil
action, for double the amount of damages suffered. This sec-
tion shall not apply to the cutting of timber for the emergency
repair of a highway, fire lane or bridge upon or adjacent to
the land."3
This section does not expressly include bad faith as an element for
the recovery of double damages.
A Wisconsin decision 4 construing a similar provision5 involving
triple damages as a recovery for conversion of logs floating in the
waters of this state, without express provision for another measure of
recovery in cases of conversion by mistake, held that bad faith was
implied as an element of recovery since the court: ". . . could not think
it [the statute] was intended to apply to every conversion." The often
enunciated rule that "Statutes must be construed according to the
intention of their makers, if that can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty," was the test followed.
The usual statutes enacted by the states on this subject fall into
two general categories: those which allow double or treble damages
for any unlawful conversion followed by an exculpatory provision
restricting recovery to actual damages in case of a casual or involun-
1 "Stumpage generally refers to the sum . . ., to be paid to an owner for trees
standing or lying on the land .... 54 C.J.S. 677.
2 .[cCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 481 (1935).
3 WIs. STATS. (1953) §26.09.
4 Cohn v. Neeves, 40 Wis. 393 (1876).
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tary trespass, and those which afford a measure of enhanced damages
for wilful conversions.0 The courts in those states which have the
former type construe both provisions together and hold that wilful-
ness or bad faith is an element in the recovery of enhanced damages.1
The latter type does not present a problem since any unlawful act
which does not fall under the statute as wilful is governed by the
common law rule of single damages8 Those few states which have
statutes similar to our own can merely base their determination of
legislative intent on inference from legislative history or correlative
provision.9
The following is an attempt, through an analysis of the state statu-
tory and case history in Wisconsin, to show the intention of the legisla-
ture to afford only one rule of damages for all timber trespass regard-
less of mistake or bad faith.
Prior to 1872, two Wisconsin cases' ° allowed damages only for
the amount of the stumpage value. They held that there should be
no difference in the amount of damages whether the act was done
intentionally or through mistake since the loss to the plaintiff remained
the same in, either case unless the intentional act was coupled with
malice. If there was malice, then the doctrine of exemplary damages
would be applicable. Strongly influenced by the overindulgence of
the judiciary to timber trespassers at a time when logging was pre-
dominant, the legislature enacted section 331.1811 which provided as
follows:
"In all actions to recover the possession or value of logs, timber
or lumber wrongfully cut ... the highest market value of such
logs, timber or lumber, in whatsoever place, shape, or condition,
manufactured or unmanufactured, the same may be between the
time of such cutting and the time of the trial of the action...
shall be found or awarded to the plaintiff . .. [unless the de-
fendant] serve upon the plaintiff an affidavit that such cutting
was done by mistake, and a tender of judgment... with interest
... and ten per cent upon the whole amount as damages ....
This provision did not make bad faith an element of recovery of
enhanced damages, but rather made good faith an affirmative defense.
5 Tays. Stats. (1871) Ch. 42, §5.
6 111 A.L.R. 79.
7 Stewart v. Sefton, 108 Cal. 197, 41 P. 292 (1895) ; Wallace v. Finch, 24 Mich.
255 (1872); McHargue v. Calchina, 78 Ore. 326, 153 P. 99 (1915).
s Smith v. Lundy, 175 Miss. 485, 167 So. 631 (1936) ; Glenn v. Adams, 129 Ala.
189, 29 So. 836 (1900).
9 Cookv. Bennet Gravel Co., 90 N.J.L. 9, 100 A. 331 (1917) in which the
provision was restricted to those acting in bad faith because criminal liability
was also imposed.
10 Weymouth v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 17 Wis. 550 (1863);
Single v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299 (1869) ; on rehearing, 30 Wis. 570 (1872).




Thus in Webber v. Quaw, 2 where the greater damages were re-
covered from one who converted by mistake, but failed to serve the
affidavit of mistake, the Supreme Court stated:
"We hold therefore that the statute, both in terms and intention,
comprehends all cases of unlawful and unauthorized cutting of
logs and timber on the lands of another, or where such cutting
is done without right, and fixes the invariable rule of damages
in all such cases at the highest market value of such logs or
timber between the time of such cutting and the trial of the
action, unless the defendant... [file an affidavit of mistake]."
Nothwithstanding Cohn v. Neaves,"3 the court declared that the legisla-
tive intent was to apply one rule of damages to all conversions, unless
there be established the affirmative defense of mistake.
The predecessor of section 26.09 was enacted in 1905, providing
for double damages for wilful trespass.14 This section encompassed
unlawful cutting, but the term "wilful trespass" implied the element
of bad faith precedent to recovery.' 5 The term "wilful" is "used to
define an act done consciously, and intentionally or knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse."' 6 Under Chapter 252 of the
Laws of 1949, the subject of this provision not only was changed
from "trespass" to "cutting of timber," but also the degree of intent
as an element of recovery was changed from "wilful" to "unlawful."
Wrongful and unlawful may be used synonomously to include any-
thing done contrary to law.17 Wrongful cutting as defined by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court means, ". . . any unlawful cutting, and
precludes that a cutting may be wrongful yet done by mistake."' 8 Since
the Supreme Court had given an interpretation to these two terms in
connection with this subject, it is logical to assume that it was the
legislative intent to include all cases of unauthorized cutting.
The present enactment expressly excepts "cutting of timber for
the emergency repair of a highway, fire lane or bridge upon or adja-
cent to the land"'8 from its dominion. The express exclusion from
liability for cutting for certain purpose implies blanket inclusion for
all other purposes.
Another section of the Wisconsin Statutes 0 allows the tender of
payment, in cases of involuntary trespass, to go toward mitigation of
"246 Wis. 118, 49 N.W. 830 (1879).
"s See supra, n. 4.
'4 WIs. STATS. (1905) §1494-60.
'5 Boneck v. Herman, 247 Wis. 592, 20 N.W.2d 664 (1945).
16 68 C.J. 268.
1766 C.J. 34.
28 Webber v. Quaw, supra, n. 9.
19 See supra, n. 8.
20 WIs. STATS. (1953) §331.17.
[Vol. 39
RECENT DECISIONS
damages. This was amended in 194921 to expressly exclude the cove-
rage of timber trespass.
Thus the legislature indicated its disfavor toward lenient treat-
ment of timber trespassers by the enactment of section 331.18 in 1873.
The awareness one the part of the legislature in 1873 that bad faith
is normally considered an element in the recovery of enhanced damages
is expressly shown by the provision for an affidavit of mistake. By
the abolishment of section 331.18, the amendment to 331.17, and the
important change from the term "wilful" to "unlawful" in section
26.09 it can be logically concluded that the legislature intended that
the rule of double damage should be applied to all cases of timber
trespass, whether done wilfully or by mistake.
GEORGE RADLER
Administrative Law-Jurisdiction of Courts in Railway Wrong-
ful Discharge Cases Under Collective Bargaining Agreements-
Plaintiff for many years was employed by the defendant railway
company in its Wisconsin Law Department in the City of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, as a stenographer-typist and clerk. In August, 1947, the
plaintiff was discharged allegedly in violation of a collective bargain-
ing contract which was in force at that time between the defendant
and the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship, Freight Handlers,
Express and Station Employees. An action was commenced in the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin in which plaintiff, after alleging certain items of damage,
demanded judgment for $6,000.00 and for a decree reinstating her to
her former position with her seniority, pension, vacation and pass
rights unimpaired. The District Court conducted a hearing on the
issues of (1) whether the plaintiff was covered by the contract or
was expressly excluded and (2) whether the court has jurisdiction
over the matter. The court concluded that the plaintiff's position "was
excluded" by the contract and, second, that the matter was "not pro-
perly before this court, and should have been brought before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board because it involves a grievance
and dispute arising under a bargaining agreement." The District Court
therefore dismissed the complaint on the merits. Plaintiff appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and filed
a motion that oral argument limited to the question of the jurisdiction
of the District Court be held in advance of a hearing on the merits,
which motion was granted. Thus, the appeal presented the question
of whether or not the District Court had jurisdiction to pass on a
question of the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
21 Ch. 252, Wis. Session Laws (1949).
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